Financial Performance of Hospitals in Maine, 1993-2003 by Kane, Nancy
Maine Policy Review
Volume 13 | Issue 2
2004
Financial Performance of Hospitals in Maine,
1993-2003
Nancy Kane
Harvard University
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/mpr
Part of the Health and Medical Administration Commons, and the Health Services Research
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UMaine.
Recommended Citation
Kane, Nancy. "Financial Performance of Hospitals in Maine, 1993-2003." Maine Policy Review 13.2 (2004) : 36 -51,
https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/mpr/vol13/iss2/8.
36 ·  MAINE POLICY REVIEW  ·  Fall/Winter 2004 View current & previous issues of MPR at: www.umaine.edu/mcsc/mpr.htm
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF HOSPITALS IN MAINE
Financial
Performance 
of Hospitals 
in Maine,
1993-2003
by Nancy Kane
Hospitals are the largest single component of healthcare
expenditures. Nancy Kane’s study of hospital financial
performance fulfills a mandate of the Dirigo Health Reform
Act. By most financial measures, Maine’s hospital industry
outperformed hospitals nationwide and in the Northeast
during 1993-2003. Still, there is major variability among
the state’s hospitals in financial performance. Kane analyzes
financial and nonfinancial characteristics of high-,
medium-, and low-performing hospitals, and suggests that
not maintaining acute inpatient volume is the biggest
problem for low-profitability hospitals. Although no
hospital is in imminent danger of failing, Kane suggests a
new “blueprint” is needed for Maine’s healthcare system,
before financial crisis and loss of access occurs. In their
commentaries on Kane’s article, Mary Mayhew provides
the perspective of the Maine Hospital Association, and 
D. Joshua Cutler gives his insights as a physician member of
the Commission to Study Maine’s Hospitals.  
Sponsored, in part, by the Maine Health Access Foundation, an organization committed to promoting affordable
and timely access to comprehensive, quality health care, and to improving the health of every Maine resident.
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INTRODUCTION
In response to concerns about healthcare cost, quality,and affordability, in May 2003 state policymakers
passed the Dirigo Health Reform Act, a comprehensive
law aimed at expanding affordable coverage to high-
quality care for all. Under this law, all parties, from
patients and providers to insurers and employers, 
are required to play a role. For example, the hospital
sector agreed to one-year voluntary limits on unit cost
increases (3.5%) and consolidated operating margins
(3%) as part of its contribution to implementing
Dirigo Health. Hospitals are the largest single compo-
nent of health expenditures, representing 35-40% of
spending. Therefore, much effort is going into under-
standing the role hospitals play in allocating scarce
health resources in Maine.
Over the last decade, Maine’s hospitals have 
generally done well financially.1 By most measures of
financial health, the state’s hospital industry has outper-
formed hospitals in the Northeast and in the country. 
At the same time, healthcare cost growth is accelerating
in Maine and elsewhere. Employers are concerned about
the high cost of health premiums in Maine, and many
are increasing the amount that employees must pay out
of pocket for insurance coverage. In addition, Maine 
has one of the highest tax burdens relative to personal
income in the country. State and federal government
finances close to 50% of all health spending, primarily
through its Medicare and Medicaid (MaineCare) prog-
rams (Wolf 2003). Affordability is a major concern.
As part of the state’s cost, quality and access initia-
tive, the Dirigo Health Reform Act established the
Commission to Study Maine’s Hospitals, whose duty 
is to provide a “report on a comprehensive analysis of
hospital costs, roles, reimbursement, capital needs, and
opportunities,” and to make policy recommendations. 
A study of Maine hospitals’ financial performance was
commissioned to assist this group and the Governor’s
Office of Health Policy and Finance in their planning
process. Presentations prepared for these groups are
available to the public (www.dirigohealth.maine.gov).
This article summarizes the hospital financial perfor-
mance study for a general policy audience. Here, we
address a number of key questions about the financial
performance of Maine’s 36
acute-care nonprofit hospitals:
How profitable have Maine
hospitals been over the last
decade, in aggregate?2
Where do aggregate hospital
financial resources come 
from and where do they 
go in Maine?
Are there major differences in
the profitability of hospitals
within Maine?
What are the nonfinancial
characteristics of hospitals
with stronger versus weaker
profitability?
How is third-party payer mix related 
to the profitability of hospitals?
What role does inpatient volume play in 
understanding the profitability of hospitals?
To what extent does uncompensated care 
affect the profitability of hospitals?
How do hospitals with strong profitability differ
from others in terms of liquidity, solvency, and
ability to maintain property, plant, and equipment?
What do financial performance differences imply
in terms of access, cost, and quality of care,
particularly for underperforming hospitals?
What policy issues arise from an in-depth analysis
of hospital financial performance in Maine? 
DATA SOURCES AND METHODS
The focus of the financial analysis in this article ison the hospital entity. Over the last decade, Maine
hospitals have consolidated into complex corporate
structures, some of which include multiple acute hospi-
tals, mental and rehabilitation hospitals, physician 
practices and health centers, long-term care facilities,
By most measures
of financial success,
the state’s hospital
industry has
outperformed
hospitals in the
Northeast and 
in the country.
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housing and real estate activities, and
other health- and non-health-related
entities. In most instances, acute-care
hospitals are the largest and most
profitable components in such systems.
They usually are the source of cash
and sometimes noncash support (e.g.,
loan guarantees, suppliers of manage-
ment and other personnel) for their
“related entities,” which are the other
organizations linked to their system
through common governance and
control mechanisms. Figure 1 shows 
a simplified example of the corporate
complexity in Maine, using the Maine
General Health system as of 2003. 
While nonhospital entities are
financially important, the approach in
this article is to focus on the hospital
entity alone, while showing the finan-
cial impact of the broader system upon
the hospital. This enables the compar-
ison of apples-to-apples, since hospital
affiliations vary considerably from
system to system. 
Financial information is derived
from audited financial statements,
particularly the consolidated state-
ments of individual hospitals within
larger corporate systems. Reported
data were standardized into a uni-
form format that is in accordance 
with generally accepted accounting
principles to enable comparisons
across hospitals and over time.
HOW PROFITABLE HAVE MAINE 
HOSPITALS BEEN OVER THE
LAST DECADE IN AGGREGATE?
One widely used financial measureof profitability is operating profit
margins, that is, the profit margin
hospitals make by providing health-
care services to patients. This excludes
the revenues hospitals earn from their
FIGURE 1: Example: Corporate Structure of a Health System in Maine
FIGURE 2: Hospital Median Operating Margins, Maine, the Northeast 
and the United States, 1993-2002
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investment portfolios or investments in other entities, 
so it is a relatively straightforward measure of how
hospitals are doing in their central mission of providing
health services in exchange for payment from patients
and their insurers.
According to Figure 2, over the decade 1993-
2002, the median (50th percentile) operating margin 
in Maine (ME) has been above the U.S. median in six
of the last 10 years, and above the median operating
margin for the Northeast (NE) for all 10 years.3 This
operating profitability fueled the financial strength of
the industry throughout the decade.
While hospitals in the rest of the country experi-
enced declining and relatively lower margins between
1997-2000, Maine’s hospitals generally remained
strong. The national decline was at least partly a result
of competitive contracting by managed care companies,
a phenomenon that largely bypassed Maine. Low
managed care enrollment and the consolidated hospital
systems in Maine reduced the opportunity to create a
competitive market system and helped maintain robust
hospital operating margins.4 The level of aggregate
operating profits in Maine over the last decade was
more than adequate to cover reasonable hospital finan-
cial requirements, as the next section will demonstrate.
WHERE DID THE RESOURCES COME 
FROM AND WHERE DID THEY GO?
Over the past decade in Maine, hospital cash oper-ating profits plus investment income were used to
reinvest in hospital property, plant, and equipment, and
to increase cash balances and working capital. Some
funds were used to acquire or financially maintain
other entities in the corporate system. Table 1 summa-
rizes where the aggregate profits made by hospitals
came from and where they went over the decade in
terms of cash flows. 
Table 1 presents a very positive aggregate financial
picture. Hospitals were able to finance internally all of
their $1.3 billion in capital expenditures (68% of cash
uses), mostly from cash operating profits (66% of cash
sources). In the aggregate (meaning, as a group), they
did not need to borrow any cash to maintain their
property, plant, and equipment. Because hospitals also
had growing resources invested in marketable securities
(e.g., stocks and bonds), they generated substantial
investment income (20% of cash sources), which
helped to finance over $300 million in transfers to
other system entities (16% of cash uses), especially 
to physician practices acquired by the systems.5
Even after capital expenditures and affiliate transfers,
aggregate cash balances (including marketable securities)
grew by over $270 million (14% of total cash uses).
TABLE 1: Maine Hospital Aggregate Cash Flows, 1993-2003
SOURCES USES 
OF CASH $000 % TOTAL OF CASH $000 % TOTAL
Expenditures on property,
Cash operating profits 1,266,806 66% plant, equipment 1,312,119 68%
Cash from investment income Transfers to
and other nonoperating revenues 391,342 20% other system entities 311,298 16%
Increase in cash (mostly) 
Donations for capital spending 74,819 4% and working capital 263,120 14%
Borrowing from external lenders 146,081 8% Increase other assets 30,760 2%
Other sources of cash 38,249 2%
TOTAL 1,917,297 100% TOTAL 1,917,297 100%
The level of aggregate operating profits
in Maine over the last decade was more
than adequate to cover hospital financial
requirements… .
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Recent research has found that non-
profit hospitals do not impose limits 
on the accumulation of cash, unlike
investor-owned hospitals, which are
subject to market-imposed limits
(Rivenson 2004). There is ongoing
debate over whether the accumulation
of cash balances beyond working
capital and creditor requirements is an
appropriate or efficient use of charitable
assets, given the problem of afford-
ability of health insurance, but no
policy conclusions have yet emerged.
The level of cash accumulated by
Maine hospitals was fairly typical of
what was going on in nonprofit hospi-
tals nationally at the same time, espe-
cially during the stock market boom
of the mid-to-late 1990s. As of 2003,
the median level of days cash on hand
was about 70 days, with a range of
four to 305 days.6
Philanthropy, in the form of
donations for buildings and equip-
ment, while important sources of com-
munity support, provided only 4% of
total cash sources over the decade.7
Borrowing from external lenders
provided only 8% of cash sources.
Thus, in the aggregate, the bulk of
resources required for hospitals to
maintain plant and equipment, and to
acquire and maintain extensive corpo-
rate system entities, came from inter-
nally generated sources, not borrowing
or philanthropy.
ARE THERE MAJOR 
DIFFERENCES IN THE 
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF 
HOSPITALS WITHIN MAINE?
While the aggregate picture of thehospital industry in Maine is
financially robust, there is significant
FIGURE 3: Average Maine Hospital Operating Margins 
by Financial Performance Group, 1993-2003
*1995 is the year that state rate regulation ended.
FIGURE 4: Average Maine Hospital Total Margins,
by Financial Performance Group, 1993-2003
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variation in performance within the industry. In order
to give a clear picture of financial conditions and
reasons for variability, hospitals were divided into three
groups based on their most recent five years of opera-
tion and profitability. Figure 3 shows the operating
profits of the hospitals separated into high-, medium-,
and low-performance groups.
There are 12 hospitals in the high-performing
group, 12 in the medium-performing group, and 12 in
the low-performing group. The low performers appear
to have struggled financially, even before the lifting 
of Maine hospital rate controls in 1995. While they
enjoyed a few years of operating profitability from
1994-1996, the group average turned negative by
1997 and stayed there through 2003. The other two
groups performed quite well, particularly after rate
controls were removed, reaching peak operating prof-
itability in 1998 and 1999 before dropping back to
the 1995-1996 level in 2002. Another good year for
the high performers was 2003, but the average for the
medium performers continued to decline. 
When investment income (on marketable securities
and cash balances) and other nonoperating revenues are
added to the operating profit margin, we see a wider
spread in performance between these three groups in
the 1997-2003 period. This combined margin is
known as the total margin. As can be seen in Figure 4,
the high performers did better, on average, than the
medium performers when investment income is added
to their margins, especially in the 1998-2001 period,
but also in the regulatory period (1993-1995). The
total margin decline since 1999 was partly a reflection
of the decline in the stock market in the 1999-2002
period. While the high and medium performers main-
tained positive total margins from 1994 on, the low
performers still did not break even in four of the last
five years (1999-2003).
WHAT ARE THE NONFINANCIAL 
CHARACTERISTICS OF HOSPITALS WITH
STRONGER VERSUS WEAKER PROFITABILITY? 
Another way of looking at financial profitability is tolook at the nonfinancial characteristics of hospitals,
including their location in the state, size (i.e., number of
staffed, acute beds), occupancy rates for acute beds, 
and status as a critical access hospital (CAH). A critical
access hospital is a small facility—25 beds or less—
that gives limited outpatient and inpatient hospital
services, including around-the-clock emergency care, 
to people in rural areas and maintains an average length 
of stay of no more than 96 hours. There are eight 
such hospitals in Maine, six in the northern region 
and one each in the central and southern regions.
Table 2 presents selected nonfinancial character-
istics of the low-, medium-, and high-performance
groups of hospitals. In terms of location (see map,
Figure 5), hospitals in the central region are the health-
iest, with two-thirds in that region falling into the
high-performance category, and one-third into the
medium-performance category.8 Hospitals in the south
region are distributed across the financial categories,
with 44% in the high-performance category, 12% in
the moderate, and 44% in the low-performance cate-
gory. The population in the south region is closest 
to the hospitals and providers in other states (New
Hampshire and Massachusetts), and is the home of
Maine Medical Center, the largest and most tertiary
hospital in the state. Because of this, the region could
face greater competitive pressures, even with fewer
acute staffed beds per 1,000 population than in the
central region (2.4 beds/1,000 in the south vs. 2.7 
in the central region). 
TABLE 2: Financial Performance Group 
by Nonfinancial Characteristics
FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE 
GROUP HIGH MEDIUM LOW
Region*
North (% Region) 3 (15%) 8 (42%) 8 (42%)
Central (% Region) 5 (63%) 3 (37%) 0
South (% Region) 4 (44%) 1 (12%) 4 (44%)
Critical Access Hospital 0 2 (25%) 6 (75%)
Staffed Acute Beds 2001, Average 140 101 52
Acute Occupancy 2001, Average 56% 50% 38%
* Region defined by Regional Resource Center Catchment Area; see Figure 5 for the
regional map.
Numbers in bold represent group averages that are different at the .05 level of significance.
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FIGURE 5: State Health Plan Regions
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The highest number of low
performers in the state is found
in the north region. Only three
of the 19 hospitals in the north
region fell into the high-perfor-
mance group. Despite having
the greatest number of hospi-
tals, the majority of hospitals in
the north region are small, and
the north has the lowest ratio 
of staffed acute inpatient beds,
only one per 1,000 population.
If hospitals in the low-perfor-
mance group begin to fail,
populations in that region are
most vulnerable to experiencing
access problems. Six of the
eight critical access hospitals 
are in the north, a further indi-
cation that there should be
concern over access issues in
that region.
Critical access hospitals are,
not surprisingly, more likely to
be in the low-performing group
than any other, and none made
the high-performance group.
Critical access status has only
recently been granted, and most
hospitals have only been CAH
for a year or two. For those in
the first wave of CAH status,
profits in particular have not
changed markedly. A couple of
CAH hospitals are surviving
primarily on transfers from affili-
ated hospitals and/or nonoper-
ating gains/support.
Also not surprising, the low performers had the
smallest average bed sizes and lowest average acute
bed occupancies of the three groups. However, there
were five small (50 beds and under) hospitals in the
moderate-performance group, and three in the high-
performance group. Also, one relatively large hospital
(over 100 beds) fell into the low-performance group. 
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Low occupancy also does not automatically result
in poor financial performance. The acute occupancy
range in the high-performance group was 40-77%,
while in the low-performance group it was 10-66%.
HOW DOES THIRD-PARTY PAYER MIX RELATE
TO THE PROFITABILITY OF HOSPITALS?
There were some significant differences in payer mix percentages by profitability group, as Table 3
shows. Results will be discussed by payer. 
Medicare
The high performers had significantly lower
Medicare inpatient revenue percentages than did 
the low or medium performers; while the medium
performers had significantly higher Medicare outpatient
percentages of revenue than the high performers.
However, the low and medium performers were not
statistically different from each other for inpatient or
outpatient Medicare percentages. This indicates that
having a relatively high percentage of gross inpatient
revenues from Medicare is not enough, by itself, to 
put a hospital into the low profitability category. 
Medicaid
The low performers had a statistically signifi-
cant and lower percentage of inpatient revenue from
Medicaid. The medium and high groups were not
significantly different in the percentage of their 
inpatient revenue from Medicaid. For outpatient 
care, there were no statistically significant Medicaid
percentage differences between the groups. Thus,
having a higher proportion of Medicaid patients
does not appear to be a driving force for low prof-
itability in this period.
Other Payers
The high-performance hospitals had significantly
more “Other Payers” (largely privately insured patients)
than did the medium and low performers. This held
true in both the inpatient and outpa-
tient categories. But the medium
performers had the lowest average
percentage of “Other Payers,” and still
outperformed the low performers.
Thus, having a high percentage of
“Other Payers” helps explain why the
high-performance group did so well,
but does not explain why the low-
performance group did worse than 
the medium-performance group.
“Cost-shifting” is often blamed as the source of
high prices faced by employers paying private insurance
premiums. Cost-shifting in this instance describes the
practice of obtaining higher payment-to-cost ratios from
the private sector to offset shortfalls when payments
from public sector patients (Medicare and Medicaid) 
are below “cost.” Historically, private sector payers have
paid higher payment-to-cost ratios than have public
payers, although the private sector ratio declined nation-
ally during the 1990s under managed care contracting.
TABLE 3: Financial Performance Group 
by Hospital Payer Mix
FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE 
GROUP HIGH MEDIUM LOW
Average % inpatient gross 
revenue,1999-2003
Medicare 57.8% 61.1% 64.5%
Medicaid 11.4% 12.6% 8.9%
Other Payers 30.8% 26.3% 26.6%
Average % outpatient gross 
revenue, 1999-2002
Medicare 31.5% 36.8% 35.2%
Medicaid 11.8% 13.4% 12.1%
Other Payers 56.7% 49.7% 52.7%
Source: Maine Health Data Organization
Numbers in bold are statistically different from the nonbold numbers at the 1% level.
…having a higher proportion of Medicaid
patients does not appear to be a driving force
for low profitability in this period [1999-2003].
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This analysis shows that the hospitals in Maine with 
the highest proportion of private payers (the high
performers) achieved superior profitability. However, 
the medium performers, which have the least ability to
cost shift (the lowest proportion of private-pay patients),
achieved very reasonable profitability as well as solid
performance on other financial measures (discussed
later). The high performers may well be “cost-shifting”
to their privately insured patients, but not just to cover
operating cost shortfalls on public
patients; they achieved higher profits,
cash balances, and capital spending
than would have been possible with
less cost-shifting. 
WHAT ROLE DOES 
INPATIENT VOLUME PLAY 
IN UNDERSTANDING THE 
PROFITABILITY OF HOSPITALS?
Volume is a factor in under-standing the differences in prof-
itability among the three groups, as
seen in Figure 6. The low performers
had the lowest aggregate growth in
the total number of discharges in all
three payer classes over the period
1999-2003. Statewide, there was a
reduction in the number of other
payer discharges and a fairly large
increase in the number of Medicaid
discharges. The high and medium
performers absorbed most of the
growth in Medicaid. The low
performers had the greatest loss 
in other payer discharges over the
period 1999-2003.
The trend in total discharges is perhaps the most
telling difference between low performers and the
other two performance groups. While the higher prof-
itability groups experienced a roughly 5% increase in
discharges in 2003 over 1999, the low profitability
group had 0.9% fewer discharges in 2003 than in
1999. Not maintaining acute inpatient volume, regard-
less of payer mix, may be the biggest problem facing
the low-profitability group. Why this is happening
should be a focus of the Dirigo state health planning
process. Are these hospitals no longer needed for acute
inpatient care (e.g., population declines, a shift to
outpatient care), or are there factors such as shortages
in specialists or technology/equipment that account
for the lack of inpatient volume growth in the low-
performance hospitals?
FIGURE 6: Percentage Change in Number of Discharges,
2003 Over 1999, by Hospital Financial Group 
and Payer Class
Source: Maine Health Data Organization
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Not maintaining acute inpatient volume,
regardless of payer mix, may be the biggest
problem facing the low-profitability group.
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TO WHAT EXTENT DOES 
UNCOMPENSATED CARE  
AFFECT THE PROFITABILITY 
OF HOSPITALS?
Uncompensated care falls into two types: free care and bad debt.
Free care (also known as charity 
care) represents services provided for
which payment was never expected
and is not pursued from the patient.
Hospitals value free care at charges
on their financial statements, which is
different from the cost of providing
the care. Bad debt represents service
charges for which a hospital expected
to collect but does not receive
payment. Bad debt also is valued 
at charges. 
Figures 7A and 7B show the
distribution of free care among the
hospital financial performance groups.
Figure 7A shows that free care (valued
at gross charges) is a small and declining percentage of
hospital gross revenues across the three groups, with all
three groups providing roughly the same level of free
care, between 0.8% and 1.6% of gross revenue. Figure
7B shows that the bulk of free care provided, valued at
cost, is provided by the high-performing group (52%);
this is fairly consistent across the years of this analysis.
Thus, it does not appear that the burden of hospital
free care falls disproportionately upon the low
performers. It would not be the primary driver for 
their relatively poor operating and total margins.
Figures 8A and 8B show that the highest burden
of bad debt expense appears to fall on the high-perfor-
mance group, while the low-performance group has 
a more erratic but generally lower ratio of bad debt
expense to gross patient service revenue. As with free
care, the bad debt burden (valued at cost) falls most
heavily on the high-performance hospitals. The low-
performance hospitals have a slightly higher share of
bad debt (15%) than they do of free care (12%). Why
there is this difference is not clear; it could have to do
FIGURE 7A: Free Care as a Percentage of Gross Patient 
Revenue,Average Values by Financial Performance 
Group, 1993-2003
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FIGURE 7B: Free Care at Cost in Aggregate, by 
Financial Performance Group, 2003
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with service mix or the income levels
of the hospital service area, the types
of insurance products sold, or with
differences in how patients might
qualify for or find out about free care.9
HOW DO HOSPITALS WITH
STRONG PROFITABILITY 
DIFFER FROM OTHERS 
IN TERMS OF LIQUIDITY,
SOLVENCY, AND ABILITY TO
MAINTAIN PROPERTY, PLANT,
AND EQUIPMENT?
Akey liquidity measure is days cash on hand (Figure 9). This
measures how many days a hospital
can go without collecting any revenue
and still be able to pay its cash oper-
ating expenses. For this performance
measure, the low performers kept up
with the high performers until 1998,
when their cash balances went on a rapid downward
trajectory. This was due partly to the loss in market
value of investments in the stock market, but also
partly to the lack of operating profits as a source of
cash to maintain plant. The poor performers could not
save cash because they needed to spend it on capital
needs. The medium performers never accumulated the
levels of cash of the other two groups; this was partly
because they transferred relatively more of their total
cash to affiliates (18% of total cash uses) rather than
keeping large cash balances on hand.
The high performers lost roughly $33 million 
in the value in their marketable securities holdings as
stock market values declined between 1999 and 2002;
the 2003 recovery is captured by the uptick in days
cash on hand for the high performers, part of which
came from recovering some of the unrealized losses
suffered earlier. Still, at year end 2003, this group had
between 52-306 days cash on hand, although only
three hospitals had over 150 days cash on hand. 
Solvency ratios measure the ability of the hospital
to pay back its long-term debt or mortgages. Figure
10 shows the equity financing ratio, which is the
FIGURE 8A: Bad Debt as a Percentage of Gross Patient Service Revenue,
Average Values by Financial Performance Group, 1993-2003
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FIGURE 8B: Bad Debt at Cost, in Aggregate,
by Financial Performance Group
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amount of equity relative to total
assets, or the proportion of internal
financing that the hospitals use to
maintain their working capital and
buildings, equipment, and other assets.
A higher ratio is more favorable as it
indicates less financial risk and better
access to credit.10
In Figure 10 it is apparent that
the low performers were doing better
than the high performers until 1999,
when their equity ratio deteriorated,
ending below 50% by 2003. All three
categories of hospitals increased their
long-term debt over the period 1999-
2003. However, for low performers,
equity lost value because of operating
losses. The medium performers also
experienced a decline in relative levels
of equity in the period 2000-2003,
largely due to affiliate transfers and
unrealized losses on marketable securi-
ties. The high performers actually
increased their equity ratio in 2002-
2003, despite large affiliate transfers
and unrealized losses; this increase was
driven by strong profitability. 
One measure of the ability to
maintain property, plant, and equip-
ment is plant age. Figure 11 shows that
the high performers have by far the
youngest plants, and have been largely
successful at maintaining the age of
their plants and equipment throughout
the decade. Both the moderate and 
the poor performers have a gradually
aging plant over the decade. Overall,
hospitals in Maine have maintained 
a median plant age that is roughly
equal to the national median, and is
slightly younger than the median in
the northeast region.
The high performers reinvested
in their plants at a rate that was
roughly 173% of depreciation
FIGURE 9: Days Cash on Hand, Including Board-designated Cash,
by Financial Performance Group, 1993-2003
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FIGURE 10: Average Equity Financing Ratio, by Financial Performance Group,
1993-2003
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expense, or the value of the plant written off over the
decade; the moderate performers reinvested at a rate of
153%, while the poor performers reinvested at a rate
of 145% of the value of the plant written off. In
Maine, a ratio of capital expenditure to depreciation
expense of 150% over a 10-year period was the cut-
off point at which hospitals were able
to maintain plant age or even reduce
it. Investing at less than 150% is asso-
ciated with an aging plant. 
The low performers’ investment 
in property, plant, and equipment was
constrained largely by their inability 
to generate operating profits over this
period, particularly in the later years.
The medium performers, which started
out the period with the youngest
median plant age, ended as the oldest
age. This relatively low level of plant
investment does not appear to be due
to lack of capacity to invest; it is
possible that this group of hospitals
has favored cash conservation and
affiliate investment over hospital capital
investment in recent years, particularly
as the value of marketable securities
declined. They made a significant
investment of $135 million in affiliates
over the decade, which may have been
a higher priority than updating prop-
erty, plant, and equipment. 
WHAT DO FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
DIFFERENCES IMPLY IN TERMS OF ACCESS,
COST, AND QUALITY OF CARE, PARTICULARLY
FOR UNDERPERFORMING HOSPITALS?
Several access, cost, and quality variables were exam-ined to see if there were differences among hospi-
tals in the three financial performance groups. Selected
measures are displayed in Table 4.
The first two variables, inpatient charge per
discharge (hospital list price per discharge) and inpa-
tient cost per discharge (what the hospital actually
spends per discharge), are case-mix adjusted. Case mix
is the distribution of patients into categories reflecting
differences in severity of illness or resource consump-
tion. Case weight is the relative resource intensity of
the inpatient case mix; for example, a low case weight
implies relatively low intensity. Hospitals with low
average case weights are expected to also have lower
FIGURE 11: Maine Hospital Plant Age, by Financial Performance Group,
1993-2003
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TABLE 4: Cost and Access, by Financial Performance Group
FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE 
GROUP HIGH MEDIUM LOW
Average inpatient charge 
per discharge, 2002 $10,334 $10,283 $9,199
Average inpatient cost 
per discharge, 2002 $5,657 $5,619 $5,508
Average case weight, 2002 1.096 1.125 0.97
Average % admissions for 
ambulatory care-sensitive 
conditions 21% 25% 27%
Bold numbers are statistically significant at the 10% level or below.
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costs, and therefore are generally paid less per discharge
than hospitals with higher case weights. 
The values for average inpatient charge per
discharge and average inpatient cost per discharge 
in 2002 were both slightly lower in the low-
performing group, but the differences are not statisti-
cally significant. The hospitals in the lower financial
performance group are neither cheaper nor more
expensive on a charges basis, on average, than the
hospitals in the other two performance categories. 
Nor are they more or less efficient in terms of their
cost per inpatient discharge. 
The two variables with statistically significant
different average values between groups were the case
weight and the percentage of admissions that were for
ambulatory care-sensitive conditions. (The significance
was only at the 10% level, which is not a strong statis-
tical difference.)
Admissions for ambulatory care-sensitive condi-
tions include cases in which the patient should not have
been admitted if ambulatory care had been available
and appropriately delivered. This includes admissions
for conditions such as asthma, hypertension, diabetes,
and congestive heart failure. The low-performing
hospitals have a significantly higher proportion of
admissions for ambulatory care-sensitive conditions,
which is consistent with their relatively low case
weight. This is happening either because the ambula-
tory care system in the service area is inadequate, or
because the hospital is filling beds to maintain capacity.
Health services research indicates that having excess
hospital beds correlates highly with having a high
proportion of admissions for these ambulatory care-
sensitive conditions.
The low-performance group’s low case weight and
high proportion of admissions for ambulatory care-
sensitive conditions also are consistent with data
provided by the Maine Quality Forum on variability in
rates of admission for certain conditions.11 Hospitals in
the low financial performance group are located in
geographic areas with the highest rates of medical
admissions per 1,000 population. There appears to be 
a quality and an access issue with respect to the low
financial performance group. Part of the problem may
be related to the earlier noted lack of growth in inpa-
tient volume. Either the hospitals themselves or the
primary and/or long-term care infrastructure in their
service areas are not serving the population with the
same appropriateness of care that is common in other
parts of Maine. 
Several widely available inpatient quality measures
for 2001 also were tested, including severity-adjusted
mortality, obstetrics complications, adverse events and
wound infections. No statistically significant differences
in these measures were found among the hospital
groups. In other words, the clinical quality of inpatient
care, as measured by these variables, appears to be the
same regardless of hospital financial performance.
WHAT POLICY ISSUES ARISE FROM AN 
IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF HOSPITAL 
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE IN MAINE? 
While in the aggregate Maine hospitals are doingvery well financially, there are substantial dispari-
ties in financial performance. Those in the high finan-
cial performance group are doing well enough to have
accumulated substantial cash reserves and capital invest-
ments, even as they transferred almost $180 million 
out to affiliates over the decade 1993-2003. Those in
the medium-performing group also did well, but with
lower cash reserves and a lower rate of capital invest-
ment. Like the high-performing group, they made
significant affiliate transfers, especially in the last five
years. The low financial performance hospitals present 
a problem in terms of their long-term viability and the
appropriateness of their current service configuration 
to their local area needs.
One policy question raised by this analysis is
whether a limit on hospital profits should continue
The low-performing hospitals have a signifi-
cantly higher proportion of admissions 
for ambulatory care-sensitive conditions.
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under Dirigo Health, and if so, at what level and for
which system entities. In 2003, 13 hospitals exceeded 
a 3% operating profit, earning roughly $16 million 
in operating profit above the 3% level. However, the
current voluntary limit is on consolidated system oper-
ating profits, and these are much lower than hospital
entity profits; no consolidated margins exceeded the
3% level in 2003. Losses from physician practices,
start-up assisted living centers, community health
centers, home care, and other related affiliate activities
offset hospital profits. Dirigo Health policymakers need
to consider applying profit limits to where the profits
are first generated, if such limits are to be a meaningful
source of cost savings. There does appear to be some
room for profit limits that will not affect hospital finan-
cial viability, but it could affect the viability of hospi-
tals’ affiliates or the level of cash reserves maintained
by some hospitals.
The broader issue is whether the state should exert
pressure on more hospitals to reduce their subsidies,
particularly to physician practices, at least in some areas
where such practices might be able to operate indepen-
dently and still remain viable. While the hospitals 
in the north region may have to subsidize physician
practices to be able to retain physician presence in 
the community, this may not be the case for hospital
service areas in the central or southern regions. Some
practices are subsidized for as much as half of their
operating budgets, and represent a significant financial
burden on the sponsoring hospital. The state health
planning process initiated under Dirigo Health should
tackle this issue sooner rather than later.
Hospital trustees and the communities served by
specific hospitals should take time to learn about and
understand their hospital’s financial condition and the
strengths and weaknesses of its service configuration.
The state should post hospital-specific information 
on a public Web site that includes a standardized set 
of hospital financial ratios and a layperson-oriented
analysis to assist the public in understanding their
local hospital. 
Finally, the state needs to consider intervention 
to ensure appropriate inpatient and ambulatory-care
capacity, particularly in the northern region. This might
take the form of long-term planning; assistance to
hospitals seeking critical access hospital status or 
other types of service revisions; developing best prac-
tices in the sharing of specialty physicians, expensive
equipment, and managerial resources within a region 
or health system; financial assistance to rural physician
practices; and other measures. To the extent that a
different service configuration is desirable, the state
needs to work with the various payers to ensure that
needed services are adequately reimbursed. One
problem with the current system may be that acute
inpatient care “pays better” than do the services that 
are more needed in the area. 
While the most widely understood focus of the
Dirigo Health plan is to expand access to the unin-
sured, Dirigo also presents a new and exciting opportu-
nity to expand our knowledge and understanding of
how the health system works and does not work in
Maine. Hospitals are a key part of that system. Most
hospitals in Maine have done well, and no hospital is 
in imminent danger of failing, due to philanthropic 
and intersystem financial support, as well as accumu-
lated financial reserves. That support may not always be
there. Now is the best time to develop the blueprint for
the healthcare system for Maine, before financial crisis
and inadvertent loss of access occurs. State health plan-
ning, broad participation in the design and implemen-
tation of Dirigo Health, and an educated and informed
public are critical ingredients that will ensure that the
future of Maine’s health system is financially sound and
responsive to population needs.  
The broader issue is whether the state
should exert pressure on more hospitals
to reduce their subsidies, particularly to
physician practices… .
9. Hospitals in Maine establish
their own free care policies.
Some offer 100% discounts
to patients with household
income up to 100% of federal
poverty level (FPL), while
others offer the 100%
discount to patients with
household incomes up to
200% of FPL. Some hospitals
offer sliding scale discounts
for household incomes
between 100-200% FPL.
10. A very high equity ratio 
(e.g., above 80%) may not 
be a positive thing, as it may
indicate that the hospital
cannot borrow due to finan-
cial weaknesses, such as
extensive losses.
11. For access to the data
published by the Maine
Quality Forum on variability
in admissions in the state, see
www.dirigohealth.maine.gov.
REFERENCES
Healthcare Financial Management
Association [HFMA]. Almanac
of Hospital Financial and
Operating Indicators. Ingenix, 2004. 54.
Rivenson, H.L. The Cash Holdings of Not-for-Profit 
Hospitals. Dissertation in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy (Health Services Organization and 
Policy). University of Michigan, 2004.
Wolf,Wendy J. “The Challenge of Preserving and
Expanding Affordable Healthcare in Maine.” 
Maine Policy Review. 12.1 ( Spring 2003): 56-68.
View current & previous issues of MPR at: www.umaine.edu/mcsc/mpr.htm Fall/Winter 2004 ·  MAINE POLICY REVIEW  ·  51
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF HOSPITALS IN MAINE
ENDNOTES
1. In the analysis and discussion in this article, rehabilita-
tion and mental health hospitals are excluded. The
Maine General Health System, which has two hospi-
tals, one in Augusta and one in Waterville, is treated 
as a single entity. Because the Maine Health Data
Organization (MHDO) still reports data from these
two hospitals separately, in MHDO’s count there are
37 acute-care hospitals. In the analysis here, we use 
the total of 36 hospitals.
2. Even though Maine’s acute-care hospitals are all
“nonprofit,” they do make profits. Nonprofit hospitals
are tax-exempt due to their charitable mission, but
they need to make profits in order to maintain their
property, plant, and equipment, to finance working
capital, and to finance other strategic initiatives such
as expansions of service.
3. Comparative data are not yet available for 2003.
4. Twenty of Maine’s 36 acute-care hospitals are in 
four state-wide systems; three more are in multistate
systems.
5. For instance, in 2001 and 2002 combined, 58% of trans-
fers to affiliates went to support physician practices,
20% to other operating entities, 14% to parent entities,
and 8% to support other hospitals in the system.
6. Days cash on hand represent the number of days a
hospital could continue to meet its cash operating
expenses without collecting another dollar of revenue
in cash. Top-rated hospitals in the bond market report
a median of roughly 100 days cash on hand in 2002
(HFMA 2004).
7. This excludes philanthropy provided for operating
support, which for some hospitals in Maine is
substantial. Such support is reported as “nonoper-
ating revenues.”
8. Regional characteristics are from the Governor’s
Office of Health Policy and Finance, Maine Healthcare
System Profile Assessment, Data Template Draft,
10-29-2004.
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